Media Discourse of War:
World War II and the "War on Terrorism"

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1. Introduction

This paper is intended to demonstrate the existence of a wartime register and characterize its major stylistic and rhetorical peculiarities. The main area of research chosen is the wartime discourse of Japanese newspapers written in English during the Second World War. The secondary area chosen for the purpose of demonstrating the universal elements of a wartime register is media discourse in the U.S. concerning the "war on terrorism" that was initiated in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks on New York and Washington.

The reality manifested in wartime newspaper reports, especially in undemocratic states, can merely be a representation of reality because of the highly ideological dimensions involved in creating the texts. The language of wartime news reports is understood when it is analyzed comprehensively in the light of power relations and a sociological study of political language, its style, and its register. My approach to language analysis here is therefore sociolinguistic. As Halliday says, a language system incorporates cultural, societal, and situational factors, and does not exist on its own (Halliday 1978). On the basis of these ideas, this study examines how linguistic resources are used to systematize,

transform, and sometimes even mask reality. The operation of a wartime register is to categorize and label people, events, and goals so as to regulate and even control the ideas and behavior of people. Language usage does not simply encode systems of social organization, processes, and power differences; it also can be instrumental in enforcing them (Sauer 1988: 83). Wartime is a period when the most extreme pattern of control through language is practiced in order to mobilize people towards the goal of victory. In order to achieve a national goal (in this case, to wage a war), a strong form of solidarity and a control of the entire nation on the basis of consensus are essential. Such a national goal is not, however, always simple and sound enough to persuade and mobilize a whole population without provoking doubt. Often (as was especially the case up to about fifty years ago) the enemy is invisible and unfamiliar to the ordinary people. It is through media and its language that the image of the enemy is painted and presented to us. Leaders have to manipulate information to serve their purpose and to justify their cause. One of the important tools for achieving the above purposes, language plays a significant role: in categorizing, labeling, dichotomizing (*us* versus *them*), impersonalizing, collectivizing, abstracting, idealizing death, and commanding through directive speech acts or strong modalizers, etc. to obscure or exaggerate truth. These linguistic devices are implicitly used as an instrument for mobilizing and exerting control.

Nevertheless, a wartime register is not just a product of some distant past when an all-out war was being conducted. It has universality and is present in the modern world. Regardless of time, it emerges whenever any society moves onto a war footing and needs mobilization of the whole population. Following the September 11th terrorist attacks on New York and Washington D.C., the U.S. entered a state of emergency and began a "war against terror" (e.g., through bombing attacks on Afghanistan), at the same

time proclaiming a possible attack on Iraq. Although the nature of war has changed and has become more complex in the last six decades, the necessity of a wartime register remains the same when a nation is in danger and needs to mobilize the support of general public opinion.

For these reasons, I shall consider how control is enforced through some form of language usage that differs from the ordinary rules and directives by which interpersonal control is obviously managed. Although discourse in the press manages without directive speech acts or explicit command structures, it is clearly intended to be an instrument aimed at affecting and controlling the behavior of people.

2. Categorizing, Labeling, and Thought Control

Categorizing is the basis for all scientific activities and an instrument necessary for influencing people's perceptions. Fowler says that,

> if we imagined the world as a vast collection of individual things and people, we would be overwhelmed by details and chaos. We manage the world, make sense of it, transform chaos into a cohesive order by categorizing objects, people and other phenomena (Fowler 1991: 58, 92).

Categorizing can be dangerous when it is used as a political tool to manipulate public opinion. Indeed, the world presented by the press is a culturally and socially organized set of categories, based on the subjective views of reporters and editors, rather than a mere objective collection of unique individuals and events. Categorizing can seldom be value-free. What is more, "classification is likely to be of service to the position in power structure represented or favored

by the newspaper" (Fowler 1981: 29). By classifying phenomena, and giving names to them, that is, by labeling, unobservable or even nonexistent objects or people can be created to serve the purpose of people in power. Fowler explains why categorization can be deceptive and ideologically manipulative, in the following terms:

> In so far as we regard the category of person as displaying strongly predictable attributes or behaviour, the category may harden into a stereotype, an extremely simplified mental model which fails to see individual features, only the values that are believed to be appropriate to the type. This is, of course, a basic ideological process at work... [E]ssentially the things we see and think about are constructed according to a scheme of values, not entities directly perceived. (Fowler 1991: 92)

The single equation "X is Y" can involve elements of overgeneralization, overstatement, and sometimes even deception by presenting one's idea as if it is real (Bolinger 1980: 88). Indeed, the name for a category rebuilds the unique elements of certain people, of particular social problems, and of certain policies into prominent stereotypes (Edelman 1977: 40). The existence of such stereotypes is thus maintained and reinforced by repetitious usage, until such repetition induces a paralyzing effect among people.

As Halliday (1978) points out, categorization by vocabulary is a major part of the reproduction of ideology in the press, and it is especially the basis of discriminatory action when treating so-called groups of people, such as ethnic minorities, women, and young people (Fowler 1991: 84). Categorizing as an ideological operation entails techniques such as simplification and impersonalization.

2.1. Simplification: The Collective as a Single Cohesive Entity

In the ideological strategy, people and institutions are

conceived of as a collective entity, as though there is a complete identification of views and interests among all members of the collective entity. This strategy ignores individual features and ideas as complicated variables. Such simplification in categorization becomes stronger in proportion to the need for mobilizing people. Wartime is the extreme case. Categorization is based on a dichotomizing technique of constructing two camps: *us* and *them* (the enemy). In the Japanese press during World War II, the rivalry, or binary, relation was expressed in terms of a dichotomy between "Asia" and "Anglo-America". The rhetoric of justification was that Japan was fighting for the liberation of Asia from Anglo-American colonialism. Such categorization simplifies the war into a conflict between Asia and Anglo-America. This generic reference to *Asians* assumes that the interests of the whole of Asia are unified and held in common, and that all the people living in Asia recognize this "fact" by agreeing to a certain set of political ideas (Hartley 1982: 81-83). Thus in the Japanese press a quite simplified categorization was being deployed.

2.2. Impersonalization and Depersonalization

In connection with simplification, a form of impersonalization (or even depersonalization) is also predominant in the way a wartime press will represent a people. Labeled a member of a collective agent, a person loses his or her individuality and originality and becomes part of an aggregate of people. For example, in Japan people were conceived of as *shinmin* (subjects of the emperor) as laid down in the Meiji Constitution (the Great Japan Imperial Constitution). In a similar manner, the constant plurals used with reference to groups effaced individuality: *Asians, liberators, enemies, aggressors, brutal Americans,* etc. People and objects are encoded in highly abstract, emotive, and impersonalized words. In this way there is a dehumanizing transformation of the human individual into

a depersonalized collective entity. This is a kind of substitution process by which "a certain kind of individual can be replaced by nouns referring to larger abstract entities" (Fowler et al. 1979: 162). Such impersonalized nomenclature leads to depersonalization and facilitates governmental control of people in a subtle way. An impersonal style is accepted as normal in official discourse; its mood is institutional rather than personal. Categorizing functions to reinforce that official attitude of dealing with people not as individuals, but as anonymous entities; it emphasizes the roles that a collective entity is expected to play. This is because this device of labeling has the psychological effect of "relating a class of agents to a class of actions" (Fowler et al. 1979: 163) or roles that they are expected to perform. Here are two examples (bold emphasis added).

(1) "A revolution which concerns not only our armies and governments, but **every** single person in East Asia. It is **everybody's** revolution, and the revolutionary front is in **every** home and **every** town."

(*Nippon Times*, 20 November 1944)

(2) "...a new stage where the **manifest will of a billion Asiatic people** has become articulate by translating itself into a **positive joint enterprise.**"

(*Nippon Times*, 19 June 1943)

The use of generic quantifiers, such as *every* (single person) or *all* (the people), has the effect of strengthening this device of collectivization. The citations from *Nippon Times* contain several examples of such collectivization. (See also extracts in section 2.3.)

2.3. Solidarity through an Ideology of Consensus

Forming solidarity among the people in the nation is essential in waging a war. War leaders try to form a spirit of solidarity by invoking consensus. Articulating an ideology of consensus is a crucial step for exercising mind control. The idea of consensus has been explored and developed by Hall (1973), Hartley (1982), and others, along with a notion of a "consensual" view of society. Consensus presumes that, for a certain grouping of people, the interests of the whole population totally agree. Consensus assumes homogeneous systems of interests, beliefs, and experience in communities.

The language device aimed at solidarity that was adopted by war leaders in Japan during World War II spoke of two different manifestations of solidarity. First there was the solidarity of Asian countries with Japan in the fight against Western Powers and against the communists (China had not yet been taken over by the communists). Secondly, there was the solidarity among the Japanese people in the fight against the Western Powers and communism. The concept of a "consensual view of society" is, however, misleading; it is an ideological device employed in order to manipulate public opinion. The extracts that will soon follow below demonstrate that solidarity through creating consensus is simply a linguistic device for control.

Many complex economic and demographic facts could be brought forth to disprove the existence of real consensus. For example, there were (and still are) regional and class differences among Asians and within Japan, as well as in the relationship between Japan and the individual countries of Asia. The interests of Japan and other Asian countries, or the interest of Japanese leaders and the Japanese people, did not (and still do not) necessarily coincide. However, the rhetoric adopted gives the impression that

they did coincide, as we see in the examples below (bold emphasis added).

(3) "the **joint** defence against communism"
(Lieutenant-General Ando, in *The Japan Times & Advertiser*, 1 December 1941)

(4) "The **joint** communique pledged the **iron solidarity** of the nation for coping with the prevailing war situations"
(*The Japan Times & Advertiser*, 9 December 1941)

(5) "establish a new order for its **common prosperity**"
(*The Japan Times & Advertiser*, 7 December 1941)

(6) "The **Total** War Consciousness of the Japanese Nation"
(*Nippon Times*, 5 September 1943)

(7) "**Co-operation** means **co-prosperity**"
(*Nippon Times*, 3 September 1943)

(8) "**Asia's billion rally** under Banner of Pan-orientalism"
(*Nippon Times*, 9 September 1943)

(9) "The one billion people of East Asia have risen **as one man** to fight for self-existence and self-defense"
(*Nippon Times*, 27 November 1944)

If we admit that language has the function of influencing existing social structures, whether by reinforcing or by changing them, then these expressions would have had the effect of bringing together the minds of all Asian people. This is why the unity of goal, effect, and interests of all Asian people on the one hand, and of all Japanese people on the other hand (including the leaders and the

people), is repeatedly implied in terms like *cooperation, common prosperity (co-prosperity), joint defence, total war consciousness,* etc., terms that express interests and values they are supposed to share in their lives.

3. Dichotomizing: Ideological Construction of *Them* and *Us*

Dichotomizing refers to distinguishing the group that one belongs to from another group that opposes the group; this practice of polarization is often used in war rhetoric to strengthen the solidarity of the group one belongs to.

3.1. Labeling

One of the most effective ways of dichotomizing in wartime rhetoric is labeling with words that have either positive or negative images. Such words as *cooperation, victory, freedom, right, justice,* and *co-prosperity* express interests and experience that *we* share in *our* lives. These are values that are based on an ideological assumption that is conceived to be legitimate in terms of abstract systems of societal values (Fowler 1991: 51).

Steve Chibnall (cited in Fowler 1991: 52) drew up a list of some of the positive, legitimating values and negative, illegitimate values assumed in society. The following is a portion of his list.

Positive, legitimating values	Negative, illegitimate values
order	chaos
cooperation	confrontation
fairness	unfairness
constructiveness	destructiveness
freedom of choice	monopoly / uniformity
equality	inequality

This practice of dichotomizing through abstract vocabulary is a basis for the ideological construction of *them* and *us*. The positive column exhibits interests, values, and experiences that *we* share in *our* lives, and that are socially and culturally desirable qualities. In the ideological construction of an *enemy*, *they* are associated with the negative lexicon in the right-hand column. The rhetoric goes that these values of *us* are threatened by *them*. In the discussion of the construction of an *enemy*, *they* are treated as "the agents of predicates designating brutal actions" (Fowler 1991: 138). *We* are *patients* (those who are affected by the acts of an *agent*), or victims, of these *agents*. The government "must protect people" (or we must protect ourselves) against this brutality and certain categories of violent behavior. This sort of structural opposition can be explicitly seen in Chibnall's examples, in which the vocabulary dichotomizes nations or political organizations into two spheres or groups, and implies a "struggle" between them. As an old saying has it, almost every war starts with the cause of self-defense in the name of justice; the rhetoric is that *we* are, in the first place, *patients* threatened by *them*, who are *agents* of violent behavior. Now, *we* have no other choice but to become an *agent* of "a sacred war in defence of justice" (*Nippon Times*, 5 September 1943). As is obvious by now, categorization by vocabulary is an integral part of the production of ideology in the newspapers (Fowler 1991: 84).

If we apply Steve Chibnall's classification, it can be said that words and phrases with positive legitimating values were used by the Japanese press during the war period to refer to Japan's position, status, and political goals from Japan's own perspective, while words with negative, illegitimate values were used in regard to those of the Americans and Britons. Dichotomization through vocabulary can be readily found in statements appearing in the newspapers (*Japan Times & Advertiser* and *Nippon Times*) during the war.

Positive, legitimating values	Negative, illegitimate values
freedom	tyranny, totalitarianism
justice	depredation, oligarchy
liberator	oppressor
unselfish sacrifice	monopolization of the world
war to save democracy	betrayer of democracy
territorial integrity	alien-capitalist imperialism
holy mission	exploitative policies
sovereignty	domination

3.2. The Use of Abstract Vocabulary

It is interesting to note that a semantic analysis of an abstract system of values sheds much light on the analysis of the dichotomizing effect of politicized language. Lyons (1977: 442-445) classified words into three categories, according to their degree of abstractness in meaning, as follows:

1st-order entity: discrete physical objects that are publicly observable (e.g., persons, animals, things)

2nd-order entity: abstract entities that are located in time and space (e.g., states of affairs, events, processes)

3rd-order entity: abstract entities (such as propositions) that are outside space and time. They function to express reasons, beliefs, assertions, judgements, or expectations. For example, "I believe he is right" or "I expect the experiment to be successful."

We find that modes of expression referring to either side in dichotomizing practice (*them* and *us*) are 2nd-order entities (*freedom, justice, alien-capitalist imperialism*). There seems to be two reasons for

this linguistic distinction. Firstly, the enemy is often invisible to most people, as happened in Japan during World War II, since there was no direct contact between ordinary Japanese citizens and the people in other countries where Japanese troops were fighting at that time. So it was impossible for those "back home" to get worked up about a foreign enemy on the basis of concrete modes of expression referring to 1st-order entities. Information contributing to the formation of a concrete idea (represented by 1st-order entities) was concealed by Japan's military leaders as part of their manipulation of information for obfuscation purposes (i.e., disinformation as it came to be called later). Secondly, the use of 2nd-order entities helps to fabricate a biased image of the *enemy*, thus aiding the use of language for propaganda. "To spiritualize a material issue" (Burke 1984: 77) is a process of propagandization.

3.3. The Use of Plural Personal Pronouns: *We* and *They*

As a grammatical device for dichotomizing, the frequent use of plural personal pronouns, *we*, *our*, and *us* versus *they*, *their*, and *them* promotes a sense of consensual ideology. The first-person plural pronouns *we*, *our*, and *us* are used in an exclusive sense (presupposing the existence of the *enemy* outside), but more frequently in the inclusive sense (referring to effects in the community such as shock or pathos, as these are caused by the enemy). This leads to the rhetoric "We have no other choice but to unite." Both the exclusive and the inclusive functions reflect national and political ideology. The third-person plural pronouns *they*, *their*, and *them* (the people represented by the *they* pronouns threaten the lawful and humane existence of the people represented by *we*) have dichotomizing functions and also contribute to strengthen solidarity.

Like the plural personal pronouns *we* and *they*, plural noun forms such as *Asians* and *shinmin* (subjects of the emperor as laid down in the Meiji Constitution) also have the effect of

collectivization. Finally, the use of plural forms for the addressee suggests the addresser's refusal to handle the addressee as an individual person and only as an impersonalized object.

4. Construction of an *Enemy*

When pursuing a political objective, people in their human infirmity again require an enemy. If a movement must have its goal, it must also have its *devil* or *common enemy* at which the battle is targeted, as a unification device.

4.1. Collectivization of an *Enemy*

People can unite best on the basis of an enemy shared by all the people, as Hitler maintained in his book *Mein Kampf* (My Battle) (translated and cited in Burke 1984: 62-63; bold emphasis is added):

> As a whole, and at all times the efficiency of the truly national leader consists primarily in preventing the division of the attention of a people, and always in concentrating it on **a single enemy**. The more **uniformly** the fighting will of a people is put into action, the greater will be the magnetic force of the movement and the more powerful the impetus of the blow. It is part of the genius of a great leader to **make adversaries of different fields appear as always belonging to one category only**.

Constructing an enemy is "the projective device of the scapegoat" (Burke 1984: 69). It is a curative process that comes with the device to shift one's ills to a scapegoat.

4.2. Impersonalization of an *Enemy*

Collectivization of an enemy (or the device of making *enemies* look like one) goes together with their impersonalization or even dehumanization, as well as simplification. What is important to note is that a large part of the population at the grassroot level does not perceive them ("the Western *aggressors*") as enemies at all. In order to make "the Western *aggressors*" seem like the enemy to the people, and to intensify the fears and anger of the people, *enemy* forces must be categorized as evil creatures (possibly using animal images) and their perceptible human characteristics must be disregarded so as to justify extermination of the enemy (Edelman 1977: 34). Thus collectivization entails simplification and pluralization as well.

Enemies must be given labels that "highlight the covert, inhuman, incalculable qualities that make it impossible to deal with them as fellow human beings." Examples of such labels are *devil, ruthless exploiter, communist conspirators* (Edelman 1977: 35). Here, relexicalization (rewording) is called for to label an enemy. The enemy must bear labels along with negative, emotive, violent, and abstract expressions that are not given a clear-cut definition in order to create an image of an "inhuman and uncanny" being (ibid.). Evaluative adverbs and adjectives, as opposed to objective usage, are prominent, e.g., *brutally, ruthless, evil, fanatically, diabolical, hideous, mercilessly*, etc. Wartime leaders and the press tend to conceal objective and well-balanced information concerning the enemy; if they are to be successful in arousing hatred of the enemy through labeling them as inhuman and creating an image of the enemy as a mythical being, the universal humanistic nature of the enemy should not be made known. It is important that those unseen enemies be known and perceived only through abstract names and other verbal signs.

Here in Japan, for example, American and British people were portrayed as beasts by labeling them *kichiku-beiei* (brutal Americans

and Britons) to inflame people's hatred of them. In the wartime press, only the negative and inhuman aspects of the enemy were reported, using the 2nd-order-entity words of Lyons's classification, which also have negative, emotive, and violent connotations.

5. The Polarization of the World: The Rhetoric of the "War on Terrorism"

The linguistic devices of dichotomizing and collectivizing, or the ideological creation of *us* and *them*, are not just things that occurred six decades ago. They are fundamental techniques present in any war rhetoric — even today. In the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, the U.S. started preparing for an all-out assault against terrorism and called for the rest of the world to rally to the cause. There was a heightened sense of patriotism, and a slogan that indicated a shared commitment: "United We Stand." President George W. Bush addressed a joint session of Congress and the American people on 20 September 2001 — an event attended by the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair — in the following terms:

> Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. **Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.** (Applause.) From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.
>
> — George W. Bush, to a joint session of Congress,
> 20 September 2001

In a similar way, just after the U.S. and British forces launched a military assault on Afghanistan's Taliban regime on 7 October 2001, Bush said in a televised speech to the nation from the White House Treaty Room:

> Today, we focus on Afghanistan, but the battle is broad. Every nation has a choice to make in this battle. There is no neutral ground.   (cited in *The Japan Times*, 9 October 2001)

In this rhetoric of the president, a clear-cut dichotomization is explicitly found, particularly when he says, "there is no neutral ground." It is a powerful and effective device in war rhetoric not to allow a "gray zone." From a semantic viewpoint, the choice "either with us or against us" does not strictly constitute binary opposites. The choice is not logical or realistic because the indeterminacy that exists between them is disregarded. Binary opposites represent a relationship of complementarity, such as the relationship between "animate" or "inanimate," or between "male" or "female" (Palmer 1981: 111). So if it is asked whether a certain accident victim is "dead or alive," the question is logical and realistic because there is complementarity between being dead and alive. But there is not such complementarity between *enemy* and *allies*. In reality, the world represents diversity, and the majority of the world population is neither U.S. citizens nor terrorists. In addition, even among the allies of the U.S., the methods and degrees of support (combat, intelligence, financial, and diplomatic) varied. Support was given not just in logistics or military action but also in nonmilitary ways, such as providing reconstruction assistance for war-torn Afghanistan, interrupting the channels of terrorist financing, controlling the refugee population, or sharing intelligence. However, global diversity is better ignored in war rhetoric, and simplification and collectivization have to be given emphasis. Therefore, the phrase that presented a choice "either with us or against us," which is based on polarization of the world, is part of a convincing war rhetoric even if it is illogical and unrealistic. The same dichotomizing device is widely used by leaders of other nations involved in war or conflicts. It was also taken up by the U.S.'s other enemy, Iraq's president Saddam Hussein. In the summer of 2002, faced with a

possible U.S. attack on his country, Saddam Hussein said, "those who support the U.S. government are all devils."

As happened in wartime discourse during the Second World War, dichotomizing is reinforced by the use of abstract, emotive vocabulary. Steve Chibnall's classification is applicable here again; words and phrases with positive, legitimating values were adopted by the American press to refer to their position, status, and political goals, e.g. *freedom, justice, peace,* etc. On the other hand, words and phrases with negative, illegitimate values are naturally used to refer to those of terrorists, e.g. *violence, fear, totalitarianism, cruelty, murderous, tyranny,* etc. The following examples are extracts from Bush's speech made at that 20 September joint session of Congress entitled "Freedom at war with fear."

> On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country ... night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack.

> Tonight we are a country awakened to danger and called to defend freedom. Our grief has turned to anger, and anger to resolution. Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done. (Applause.)

> They are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century ... they follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism.

> Freedom and fear are at war... Our nation — this generation — will lift a dark threat of violence from our people and our future. We will rally the world to this cause by our efforts, by our courage.

> Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at

war, and we know that God is not neutral between them. (Applause.)

The rhetoric emphasizes societal values such as *freedom, justice, peace, courage,* and *democracy* that are held to be universal principles applicable to any people at any time. The rhetoric has universal elements that have been the basis of speeches made by successive American presidents over the centuries. Rather than presenting the masses with specific casualty figures or a specific policy, such rhetoric, by emphasizing these universal values, is more effective in mobilizing the masses into unity. As previously mentioned, the role of wartime rhetoric is to "spiritualize the material." However, in the course of history the nature of war has changed into something that exhibits more complexity. In World War II, the clash was between nations, and they faced discrete known enemies. But today the question is not that simple, and this results in a situation in which the clash or dichotomization can even be misused or misunderstood. Some misinterpret it as a clash between the Muslim and the free Western world. In response to the U.S.-and-British-led counterattack on Afghanistan, Taliban envoy Abdal Salan Zaeet, speaking at a news conference in Islamabad, the Pakistani capital, said:

> The U.S.-led attacks were a "terrorist" assault on the whole Islamic world. This action is not only against the "Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan," but this is a terrorist attack on the whole Muslim world.
>
> (cited in *The Japan Times*, 9 October 2001)

The misinterpreted dichotomization also had tragic consequences: the TV images of Palestinians celebrating the attacks on the Twin Towers inflamed anger against even uncommitted Arab Americans in the U.S. Bush rejects this dichotomization in his 20 September speech in the following terms:

The terrorists practice a fringe form of Islamic extremism that has been rejected by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics — a fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam....

I also want to speak tonight directly to Muslims throughout the world. We respect your faith... Its teachings are good and peaceful, and those who commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the name of Allah. (Applause.) The terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself. The enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends; it is not our many Arab friends. Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists, and every government that supports them. (Applause.)

The American president, who had adopted dichotomization in his own speech rhetoric, was quite aware of the dangers as well as advantages inherent in dichotomization, and thus implicitly warned against it to protect innocent Arab Americans.

6. Conclusion

This paper has tried to show how linguistic resources in war discourse are used as a unification device by categorizing, labeling, dichotomizing, abstracting, and impersonalizing. For the main area of data analysis, Japanese newspapers written in English during the Second World War were used. These linguistic devices are, nevertheless, not simply ancient techniques employed sixty years ago. They are still alive and extensively adopted in the war rhetoric of the present day. To corroborate the universality of some features of wartime register, both spoken and written media discourse employed by leaders in the U.S., Afghanistan, and Iraq was used as a secondary area for analysis.

After the September 11th terrorist attacks, the greater fear and
insecurity felt by the people increased the power of the government.
Nussbaum (2002: 38) says, "Post-September 11, the government's
size, reach, and authority expanded sharply. It grew as a
consequence of protecting U.S. citizens not only from terrorists from
across the seas but also from unethical CEOs (chief executive
officers)." Language clearly reflects societal and political conditions
and changes of the time. A strong form of wartime register emerges
when a nation is at risk and desires a stronger government. A
prominent historian, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., says in his 1986 book
Cycles of American History, "the pendulum has swung back and forth
approximately every 20 to 30 years between laissez-faire and greater
government" (discussed by Nussbaum 2002: 38). If this is so, now is
one of those times when people are calling for more government
functions to secure their lives. This is reflected in President Bush's
televised speech in October 2002; "America is united. America is
strong. America will remain strong." In the midst of the Cold War
in the 1980s, the Reagan administration called the Soviet Union of
that time an "Evil Empire", which obviously reflects a propagandistic
use of language. During the period from the end of the Cold War to
11 September 2001, U.S. foreign policy was centered almost
exclusively on business and trade. In this period, the extreme form
of political propaganda we have discussed above was not found.
Thus, the existence of a war register is clearly confirmed in a context
of war or war-like situations, where a strong form of government or a
strong nation is in urgent demand.

Finally, it is important to mention that there is a much wider
variety of language usage and speech acts that affect people's thought
and behavior, or that enforce control through language, than what
was discussed above. Examples are modality, temporal
manipulation, and repetitious usage of certain language phrases, to
mention a few. What I have discussed in this paper are just some
functions among the many extensive means of wartime rhetoric that

deserve further investigation.

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