

A Critical Review of Eugene Winter's Clause Relational Approach towards Written Discourse

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0. Introduction

In this paper an analytic approach towards written text structure generally known as the clause relational approach is critically reviewed. It was originally developed by Eugene Winter and his associates such as Michael Hoey, who regarded the semantic relation established between two clauses in text as the minimum unit for analysis. I am interested in this task since it is the clause relational approach that shaped the most basic characteristics of my own analysis of written text. By reviewing the theory I would like to clarify the linkage between it and the analytical method I have been trying to develop. I unhesitatingly ascribe many basic notions used in my analysis to the clause relational approach, but this point requires a further explanation.

I have been trying to develop an analytical method designed to elucidate the text writer's communicative intention. I believe that text comprehension is explained as a process in which the reader constructs a type of mental representation of the writer's intention to share his/her view on the world. The mental representation is explained as a predictable chain of logical relations established among propositions that are retrieved not only from the explicit parts of text but also from implicit pieces of information supplemented by the reader in the comprehension process. Each element of the logical relational complex is assumed to be awarded some status which is defined in terms of its function in the whole complex. For instance, the complex might consist of elements awarded such status as *the writer's recommendation of a solution*, *the desirable consequence of the solution*, *the writer's warning against inaction* and *the undesirable consequence of inaction*. A particular pattern of status assignment to the elements of a complex is associated with a specific communicative effect. The complex comprising the above-mentioned elements, for instance, has a hortatory effect.

Incorporating mentalistic notions such as mental representation and intention into a theory could make it appear so deviant from the norm respected by many discourse analysts which emphasises the importance of retaining the surface form of text as intact as possible throughout the analysis that it can no longer be regarded as retaining an appropriate form of a discourse theory. Established in the 1970s, the clause relational approach also abides by the empirical tradition rather strictly: they concentrate on the description of what is directly observable in the target text. This principle is most evidently reflected in one of Hoey's early works (1983) which is titled *On the Surface of Discourse*¹.

¹ It is interesting to note that in 1983 when *the Surface of Discourse* was published, another influential book was also published by Teun A. van Dijk and Walter Kintsch: *Strategies of Discourse Comprehension*. In this work the authors established the theoretical foundation for the view on text comprehension as the reader's effort to construct a mental representation using various strategies.

It should be noted, however, that proponents of the clause relational approach were well aware of the importance of various kinds of mental operations involved in the processing of text. Their concentration on the surface form is considered to have resulted from the practical decision to identify various linguistic signals as concrete evidence for text structures. Though it is obvious that every aspect of language is related to some mental operation, any mental representation worthy of serious consideration should be based on linguistic evidence identifiable in the text. Their insistence on the surface form contributed to the fruitful lexical studies exemplified by Winter's and Hoey's works and later to the remarkable development of corpus linguistics that has been advocated and advanced at some institutions such as the University of Birmingham.

Thus, incorporating mentalistic notions such as communicative intention possibly makes my theory deviate from the empirical tradition and makes me step into the highly controversial field of human mind, from which Hoey (1983) understandably decided to keep away staying on the surface of discourse instead. From a practical point of view, even with the advantage of the recent remarkable advance in cognitive science and information technology, it may still be text as a product rather than something assumed to be happening in the mind of the reader or the writer that is worth describing in the study of text. Admitting some difference in the attitude towards mental representation, I still claim that my ideas have derived from the clause relational approach or at least could be better understood in relation to it.

Though the mental representation postulated in my description of comprehension contains various elements that are not directly retrieved from the text, I claim that it is possible to describe it in a fairly consistent manner by making use of a group of well-defined concepts. The purpose of this paper, however, is not to illustrate them but to identify which aspects of the clause relational approach could be modified to serve my purpose. I will discuss my analytical method that will result from such modification elsewhere in the near future. For now readers are well-advised to regard this paper simply as a critical review of some important concepts that characterise Winter's theory on written discourse.

1. Basic types of clause relation

Among various approaches towards text structure, the theory originally developed by Eugene Winter (1974, 1977, 1982, 1992, 1994) is known as the clause relational approach. One of its most essential features is to regard the semantic relation between two clauses found in text as the minimum unit for analysis. It has been adopted by many scholars such as Michael Hoey (1979, 1983, 2001), Jordan (1984, 1992) and Crombie (1985) to name a few².

A clause relation is a semantic relation that is established between two clauses when each of them is understood in the light of the other. When two clauses in text are understood as making sense together, some type of clause relation, such as reason-result and condition-consequence, has been established between them. Clause relations are binary relations in the sense that the presence of one member of the relation in the text necessitates that of the

² Particularly, Hoey should be remembered as Winter's closest associate and his contribution to the theoretical development is represented by his study on the text organisation pattern called the macrostructure, which can be seen as a clause relational complex. One of the best-known macrostructures is the situation-problem-response (solution)-evaluation pattern, of which each element can consist of various clause relations established at lower levels of the relational hierarchy. Hoey (1983) identifies various linguistic signals for each element: lexical items such as *problem* and *difficulty*, for example, signal the Problem element of the macrostructure in the text.

other member in the adjacent context. For instance, if the writer signals one clause as the condition member in a text, the reader naturally expects that the consequence member will follow in the subsequent sentences. Such interaction between the writer and the reader can occur only when both of them share the same knowledge of the clause relation and its signals. It should be noted that the term *clause* used in the theory has a different sense from its ordinary use as the next definition of clause relations shows:

A Clause Relation is the shared cognitive process whereby we interpret the meaning of a clause or group of clauses in the light of their adjoining clauses or group of clauses. Where the clauses are independent, we speak of 'sentence relations'.

(Winter 1994:49)³

Below is presented another definition which more obviously reflects Winter's cognitive view on the notion:

When we talk about a clause relation, we are talking about the cognitive processes of the mind which come into operation the moment any two sentences or membership of sentences are placed together for the purpose of communicating meaningfully with the hearer or reader. The function of this particular joint cognitive process is to understand what these two members mean in terms of each other within a given context. I call this cognitive function the clause-relating function. It makes sense of sentences in sequence. (Winter 1977:5)⁴

Winter classifies clause relations into two broad types: *the logical sequence relation* and *the matching relation*. In addition, he also identifies a third type called the *multiple* or *mixed relation* which can be seen as a composite of the two basic types. Here, I am only concerned with the two basic types which can be seen as the most fundamental factors for the development of the two dimensions of text: syntagmatic and paradigmatic dimensions⁵. The logical sequence relation is defined as follows:

The Logical Sequence Relation is a general term for clauses which are related by the semantics of a deductive reasoning which implies the logic of time sequence or by the time sequence itself. In logical sequence the meaning of the sequence itself is crucial to identifying the relation. (Winter 1982:88)

Some examples of the logical sequence relation are *reason-result*, *condition-consequence*, *means-instrument* and *premise-conclusion*.

The matching relation, on the other hand, is defined as follows:

In contrast with logical sequence, the matching relation does not impose a logic of sequence upon its members other than that of the logic of comparison. In the matching

³ This definition of clause relation as a type of cognitive process implies that Winter was well aware of the possibility to develop a more full-fledged mentalistic approach toward text though his emphasis seems to have stayed on the surface form of discourse.

⁴ It should be added that reviewing Winter's work, Hoey (1983:19) expands the cognitive aspect of the notion still further and writes as follows: A clause relation is also the cognitive process whereby the choices we make from grammar, lexis and intonation in the creation of a sentence or group of sentences are made in the light of its adjoining sentence or group of sentences.

⁵ See Quirk et al. (1985:41) for a discussion of the same notions applied to the syntactic level.

relation, we are concerned with a matching or comparing of people, things, attributes, action, states, description, etc. (Winter 1982:88)

Clauses in this relation can generally be interpreted in terms of the special formula which is used to certify its presence: *what is true of X is (not) true of Y in respect of Z feature*. When the comparison between X and Y is positive, i.e. when X and Y are judged to be similar or compatible, the relation holding between the clauses is called *comparative affirmation* (Winter 1977: 54). When the comparison is negative and X and Y are judged to be different or incompatible, the relation between the clauses is called *comparative denial*.

Also included in this type of relation are *alternatives, general-particular, appositions, contrasts and contradictions*. One important feature of the matching relation is that between the two clauses some types of syntactic or lexical repetition can be identified. The repeated information in the second clause functions as the constant to cast light on the non-repeated new information which attracts the reader's attention. This highlighting process is most extensively described as *systematic repetition* and *replacement* in Winter (1974).

A comment that should be added here is that those definitions and descriptions of basic types of clause relation discussed above obviously differ from typical structural explanations of similar concepts. Though their research is undoubtedly text-oriented in the sense that what is described there is always text as a product, the advocates of clause relational approach are well aware of the cognitive process that produces it. Staying on the surface of discourse, however, they dare not speculate, for example, what kind of cognitive process is in operation when they rather mysteriously express it as "the semantics of a deductive reasoning which implies the logic of time sequence."

2. Predictability of context for a subsequent clause

Winter's definitions of the basic types of clause relation are regarded as the most general characterisation of the relation between two clauses. The criteria for the classification of relations into the broad types are simply time sequence and comparison. Classifying all the clauses in a text into the main types, however, does not bring us anywhere: labelling each pair of clauses either as time sequence or comparison can hardly be regarded as an interesting analysis. The value of clause relations as a device for elucidating the structure of text depends on their specific meanings.

The three main types of clause relation are considered to be the general categories which can subsume more specific types of clause relation. The logical sequence relation, for example, includes more specific relations such as cause-effect, condition-consequence and means-purpose relations. It is the semantic specificity of the clause relation that enables the reader to predict in what context the next clause should be interpreted. If a clause is understood as a condition, then the subsequent clause is predicted to provide its consequence. On the other hand, if a clause is understood simply as an incident, the context in which the next clause is understood might not be so predictable: the next clause might express another incident that precedes or follows in time, or something to be compared with the current incident. Predictability of the context for another clause is one of the most essential characteristics of clause relations. Winter writes about this point as follows:

Clause Relation is a system of predictability of context; that is, given one sentence with its preceding context, the lexical selection in the next sentence is frequently predictable, and this predictability is the crucial part of the semantics of the clause relation.

(Winter 1977:35)

Predictability of context is explained in terms of the two notions: *a strong prediction and a weak prediction*. A strong prediction is where a particular kind of matching or logical sequence relation is predicted for the next clause while a weak prediction is where only the most general characterisation of the next clause is predicted. In spite of this dichotomous classification, it is important to note that the two kinds of prediction should be understood as the two ends of a cline.

Sometimes prediction may be very weak and then the reader can expect what follows in the text only vaguely. Such a situation could be illustrated by a question which the reader might ask after reading one clause⁶: *what happened after that?* or *what else?* On the other hand, prediction may be very strong and the reader may have a highly specified question such as *what was the effect of the solution?* Similarly in terms of the matching relation, a specific question might be *in what respect are the two persons similar?*, as opposed to a vague question such as *what are the two persons like?*

Predictability thus explained reminds one of the psychological notion of schema: a structure comprising slots and their fillers. Unlike the simple image of the reading process in which the reader or analyst attaches labels of clause relational type to each pair of clauses one after another, the reader, according to a psychological point of view, brings the schematic knowledge of clause relation into the interpretation of the text. Such knowledge might be explained as a chain of slots to be filled with their fillers, i.e. clauses. A chain consists of minimally two slots, each of which has been awarded some label such as cause, effect, condition, consequence, means and purpose. When a clause of the text is taken to fill in the cause-slot, the reader looks for another clause to fill in the effect slot. The point to be noted here is that the schematic interpretation of the clause relation leads to a shift in the perspective: from the view on text as a product to the view on text as a process. This shift in perspective also implies that clause relation might be understood as something to be imposed upon two clauses by the reader. It is possible that the reader even imposes a different type of clause relation on two clauses from that indicated by the linguistic signals though this comment should be understood as simply emphasising the dominant function of the schema brought into the comprehension process by the reader.

3. Vocabulary 3 as a closed set of linguistic signals for clause relation

3.1. Question criterion

There are various types of connective devices that can be used for specifying the type of clause relation holding between two clauses. Winter (1977) classifies them into three groups which he calls respectively Vocabulary 1, 2 and 3. Vocabulary 1 is what is traditionally known as subordinators such as *whereas*, *since* and *though*. Vocabulary 2 corresponds to the traditional category of sentence conjunction such as *on the other hand*, *in addition* and *in contrast*. The two types of vocabularies are regarded as closed-systems: their items are fixed in number and new items are rarely added to the small groups. What makes Winter's theory unique is Vocabulary 3, which consists of open-system lexical items such as *action*, *achieve*, *basis*, *contrast*, *consequence*, *deny*, *different*, *evaluation*, *fact*, *instrument*, *observation*, *problem*, *situation*, *solution*, *requirement*, *truth*, etc. The lexical items of Vocabulary 3 connect clauses in a similar way to the items of the other two types of vocabulary. In addition, they can affect the organisation of a larger part of text by predicting the subsequent information of particular quality.

⁶ Such questions are an analytical device called rhetorical questions that Winter inserts between two clauses to clarify the type of clause relation holding between them.

Based on the observation of the connective functions of Vocabulary 3 items, Winter (1977) attempts to establish them as a finite set of connectives. For this purpose he delimits the range of lexical items of Vocabulary 3 by using several criteria. One of them requires that the candidate should be included in the special type of question that is inserted between two clauses as a connector. One of the examples presented by Winter is shown below:

Example 1

Mr. Wilson appealed to scientists and technologists to support his party. **What did he achieve by doing so?** He won many middle class votes in the election.

(Winter 1977: 48, emphasis original)

This example is used to show that the question including the candidate item *achieve* can be inserted between the original sentences to indicate the type of clause relation explicitly. By virtue of this fact the lexical item *achieve* is judged to be a Vocabulary 3 item in terms of the question criterion.

However, determining entry into Vocabulary 3 is only a secondary function of this type of question in Winter's theory. Questions are primarily used to identify implicit clause relations. In the above example, the Vocabulary 3 item *achieve* enables the analyst to judge the type of clause relation as *instrument-achievement* though the two sentences do not have any explicit linguistic signals that indicate the relation as such. *Instrument* is another Vocabulary 3 item that is regarded as the other member of the binary relation.

From an empirical point of view there could be a criticism on the validity of the question technique: something which is not in the original text is included only for analytical purposes. Admitting this point, Winter still defends its use as an effective means of investigating the meaning of connective items in context (Winter 1992: 137-8).

Even if it is an analyst's invention, the question technique is very interesting since it implies that specification of clause relations can be seen as a process in which clauses are named by a certain group of lexical items. The two sentences of the example cited above are now respectively given their names, *instrument* and *achievement*, instead of being simply characterised as two clauses in time sequence. Probably, what distinguishes Vocabulary 3 from other open-system words is this naming function, which I believe is explained by Winter in the following sentences:

Vocabulary 3 words refer to their open-system words in the utterance. These open-system words must be there; they can be explicit or implicit (e.g., deletions can be put back into the clause). The open-system words look directly at the world; Vocabulary 3 words look only at their open-system words. Each gets their meaning from what they refer to. Vocabulary 3 could perhaps be regarded as a natural meta-language for the open-system words. (Winter 1977: 88)

At this point it would be useful to introduce a rather different view on Vocabulary 3 items. With respect to the psychological notion of schemata, which was discussed at the end of the previous section, the function of Vocabulary 3 will be explained as the specification of slots contained in the schemata rather than reference to the surface clause. This means that the schema-theoretic view requires a little more complex process to be postulated for the establishment of relation between clauses than the reference relation between the surface clause and the Vocabulary 3 item explained as meta-language by Winter. The Vocabulary 3 item interpreted in terms of a schema is not directly related to the surface clause but only by specifying the slot of the schema. For its semantic completion, the slot must also be filled with the information retrieved from the clause, i.e. proposition. Thus, the clause and the vocabulary 3 item are connected only by the medium of the schema. It can also be said

that it is not the clause but the slot that Vocabulary 3 items refer to. A further implication of this view is that it is possible to postulate a schema which has its slots specified by Vocabulary 3 items but has the slots unfilled with clauses or propositions. Similarly, it is also possible to postulate a schema which has its slots filled with clauses or propositions but has the slots unspecified with Vocabulary 3 items.

3.2. Anticipation

Another criterion for entry into Vocabulary 3 is called *anticipation*. It requires that the lexical item must anticipate its lexicalisation: the item expects that its meaning will be spelt out later in the subsequent part of text. Winter describes this function of Vocabulary 3 items as follows:

One of the most important connective functions of this vocabulary is that the presence of one of its items in a particular sentence can signpost what kind of information is to be presented in the sentence or sentences which immediately follow it. Such signposting function will be called anticipation. Anticipation will be treated as one of the four criteria for closed-system semantics⁷. (Winter 1977: 3)

Anticipation is explained as a relation between the anticipatory member and the anticipated member. The former is the clause which includes the Vocabulary 3 item and the latter is the clause which provides the specific meaning of the word. In the example below the Vocabulary 3 item *contrast* is included in (1), which is the anticipatory member. (2) and (3) as the anticipated member specify the meaning of *contrast*.

Example 2

- (1) There is a significant **contrast** between the national mood now and that in 1964.
- (2) Then, despite the minuteness of Labour's majority, there was some sense of exhilaration: a feeling that new opportunities were opening up for the country as a whole.
- (3) Now, this is missing (Observer) (Winter 1977: 59, emphasis original)

The lexical item *contrast* in (1) tells the reader that in the following sentences *the national mood now* and *that in 1964* are negatively compared. This specifies the context in which (2) and (3) are interpreted. The detail of the contrast does not become clear until (2) and (3) provide the specific information. This specification of the detail of contrast by (2) and (3) is an example of the function Winter names *lexical realisation* (Winter 1977: 27).

It would be useful to show a schema-theoretic interpretation of anticipation. Anticipation is understood as a case where slots of a schema are first specified by Vocabulary 3 items and then in the subsequent discourse they are filled with the propositions. When comparison is in operation like in Example 2, the lexical item such as *contrast* is supposed to specify two slots of a schema. In Example 2, two slots are specified as contrast in (1), then (2) and (3) respectively provide the propositions to fill the slots. In this view anticipation might also be considered to represent the situation of a schema which is left semantically incomplete because of the unfilled slots.

⁷ In order to explain the closed-system meanings of Vocabulary 3, Winter (1977,27) presents four criteria for entry into the vocabulary. 1. The items form a small and fairly stable vocabulary: the closed set vocabulary. 2. The items belong to the characteristic lexical vocabulary of questions. 3. Most of these items can paraphrase directly or indirectly the semantics of Vocabularies 1 and 2: the paraphrase criteria. 4. The items can anticipate the coming clause relation by their paraphrase semantics: anticipation seen as the forward reference of the contextual function of lexical realisation.

4. Meta-language

In one of his later works (1992) Winter redefines his Vocabulary 3 as part of a larger closed-set vocabulary named meta-language. One of the reasons is that he noticed the presence of lexical items such as *procedure* which fails to meet some of his criteria yet specifies the characteristics of clause relations similarly to those listed. Another reason is the presence of many abstract nouns, such as *opinion* and *assessment*, which characterise clauses in different manners from Vocabulary 3: they can signal only one clause without logically predicting another clause. Since Vocabulary 3 items are supposed to signal one of the two members of the binary relations and at the same time predict the occurrence of the other in the text, the presence of such nouns causes a theoretical problem. Winter's solution was to posit a general cohesive function under which that of Vocabulary 3 is also subsumed: the function of connecting *the unspecific* to *the specific*.

The strong emphasis placed on the notion of specificity as a criterion made questions and anticipations, which used to be regarded as criteria for the entry into Vocabulary 3, two representatives endowed with the essential quality of meta-language: *inherent unspecificness*.

Any vocabulary 3 items contained in the question necessarily have to be specified in the second clause to make sense. For instance, *achieve* in Example 1 is unspecific and has to be specified by the final sentence to make sense. Anticipation is also understood as a process in which the unspecific item is specified in the next clause. In Example 2 *contrast* is unspecific by itself and must be specified by the next sentences. Though anticipation used to be given a special status as a unique cataphoric reference, it is not regarded as a special phenomenon any longer. It is simply one of the cases where the unspecific meta-language item is made specific by the next sentence.

Winter explains the notions of the unspecific and the specific using the example below, which, for a reason that will soon become clear, does not include any meta-language item. His explanation is also cited below after the example sentences:

The division of Germany *is* rather *like sin*. Everyone is against it; everyone thinks it is inevitable. (Winter 1992: 152, emphasis original)

In the above example, the notion of *sin* presented as a metaphor, is unspecific, and would be *meaningless* except as potential subject matter if there were no *lexical realisation* to provide its specifics in the next clause or clauses. The two clauses which follow specify *how* the division of Germany is rather like sin, but *without them we have a sentence which does not communicate* because the metaphor sin is meaningless to us *without its specifics by clause*.⁸ In the full example above, we have the minimal *completion in a clause relation* because the unspecific 'like sin' has been specified, and in this case, explained as well. (Winter 1992: 153, emphasis original)

It must be noted here that Winter uses the example sentences not only for explaining the specific-unspecific relation but also for proposing a simile structure as one of the criteria for distinguishing meta-language items from open-system items. Unlike the open-system item *sin*

⁸ Winter introduces two types of specification of meta-language nouns. They are: specific by identity (where the item is named or identified by pre- or post-modifiers), and specific by clause. Specific by clause means that the noun, in addition to being identified, is specified by clause as well. Thus, in 'The problem of dealing with criminals is that they are largely antisocial rebels', the post-modifier 'of dealing with criminals' identifies the problem, the that-clause which follows provides specifics by clause.

(Winter 1992: 134)

in the first sentence, meta-language items cannot function in the simile structure. In other words, though the unspecific-specific relation holds in the example, *sin* is not a meta-language item because it functions as an element of the simile.

Winter's comment on the example quoted above also shows that the notion of lexical realisation, which used to mean specification of the anticipatory member in anticipation, has also been generalised as a case of the unspecific-specific relation. Winter comments on lexical realisation as follows:

At the last resort, all specificness means open-class lexical choice. The term we will use for the making specific of the unspecific is *lexical realisation*.

(Winter 1922: 153, emphasis original)

The revision Winter made in his new theory makes me wonder if it does not end up blurring unique characteristics of various types of clause relation by reducing them to the unspecific-specific relation. Being *unspecific* seems to be a quality of any lexical item as is well-demonstrated by *sin* in the above example though it is excluded from meta-language because of the simile test. Making such a general quality a criterion for the entry into any type of vocabulary does not look a good strategy. Besides, by emphasising the unspecific quality of the items, the revision might end up in trivializing their essential feature: they "specify" clause relations. As was mentioned before some of them specify a vague sequential relation as achievement-instrument, means-purpose, condition-consequence, etc. Others specify a vague comparative relation as comparative affirmation, comparative denial, etc.

This rather confusing discussion seems to have arisen from the dual meanings in which the term *specific* or *unspecific* is used. This point can be explained in terms of the schema we have been considering. When Winter says that all the meta-language items are unspecific, he is interpreted as saying that they simply name the slots of schemata which must be filled with fillers or propositions for semantic completeness. When I wrote above that meta-language items specify clause relations, I meant that by virtue of the semantics of these items the specification of one slot predicts how subsequent slots are specified. It might be said that Winter's comment on specification is about the paradigmatic relation between the slot and its filler while my comment is about the syntagmatic relation between the two slots.

One of the reasons for the revision of the theory was the presence of nouns such as *opinion*, which according to Winter refer to only one clause and do not seem to specify the logical context for another clause. His solution to this problem was to postulate the general function, *unspecific-specific*, which seems to cover the semantics of all the abstract nouns. With due respect to Winter's judgement on the lack of predictable clauses, I think that meta-language nouns such as *opinion* will be better incorporated into the theory of clause relations by emphasising their ability to predict other clauses in text: for example, the opinion clause predicts another clause functioning as its ground or its alternative. As was discussed before, predictability is a cline or continuum: the two broad types of clause relations, logical sequence and matching, are seen as the most general predictions about the next clause while Vocabulary 3 items such as *contrast* and *result* strongly predict the characteristics of subsequent clauses. Since clauses vary in their potential for logical connection with other clauses, it is natural to think that some of them have no or relatively weak potential for the logical connection with another clause. Accordingly, it is naturally assumed that there are lexical items (e.g. *opinion*) to refer to such clauses with weak potential.⁹

⁹ It should be added that in Winter (1994: 50) the unspecific-specific is explained as one type of comparative affirmation. Comparative affirmation also includes general-particular and appositions.

5. Basic text structures

Winter refers to clause relations among more than two clauses as a larger clause relation. One of the examples can be seen in Example 2 where the anticipatory member, (1), is lexically realised by the anticipated member, (2) and (3), which are on their own in a clause relation of comparative denial. A larger clause relation sometimes constructs a coherent whole as message. In such a case, it can be regarded as a text/discourse structure, which is discussed in this section. Though each element of a text structure often comprises multiple clauses in a hierarchical manner, it can also be only one clause. Winter explains discourse structures as follows:

We have a mutually expected text structuring or **linguistic consensus** about the beginning and the end of the structures with which we *all* comply when communicating with others. (Winter 1994: 55 emphasis original)


Winter proposes two types of text structure Situation-Evaluation and Hypothetical-Real. The first is defined as follows:

Fundamentally, this text structure is the old commonplace of saying what you know about something (the facts = the Situation for an identified X) and then saying what you think or feel about it (the interpretation of the facts = Evaluation of Situation for X, or the Evaluation of X in this Situation). ... We communicate in terms of the notion of Situation as a meaningful linguistic context which we may interpret for the decoder. (Winter 1994: 57)

It should be emphasised here that Winter defines the Situation element as facts, that is, the real situation. Situation-Evaluation has two subtypes which are regarded as more developed and complex forms: *Situation-Evaluation-Basis/Reason* and *Situation-Problem-Solution-Evaluation*. The S-P-R-E pattern¹⁰, which is best-known of all the text structures so far identified in the field, is explained by Winter as follows:

I might add that the most fully developed form of this text structure could have the addition of the elements of *Problem-Solution*, each with their own *Evaluation* elements as an aspect of the Situation element in the simplified four-part structure of *Situation-Problem-Solution-Evaluation*. (Winter 1994: 57, emphasis original)

This quotation means that the S-P-R-E sequence is a simplified version of a more fully expressed one. Hoey (1983:55) describes the fully expressed version of the pattern in a diagram shown below:



¹⁰ For the most comprehensive description of the S-P-R-E pattern, see Hoey (1979,1983).

Evaluation is a very general notion since ultimately even a selection of a lexical item could be taken to include some personal judgement or evaluation on the part of the language user. In the diagram above Problem, for example, is defined as a situation that is evaluated as such, and Response (often also understood as Solution) is defined as a situation that is evaluated as such. This view on Problem and Solution is also reflected in the following comment taken from a conversation Winter remembers having with one of his associates Jordan:

In a conversation with me, Jordan noted in passing that the one-word road sign 'Danger' is an Evaluation of the real Situation for the motorist implying a Problem whose Solution is avoidance. (Winter 1994: 62)

In this case, a real situation of the road (e.g. an acute curve in the road) was evaluated by the person who made the sign as danger, i.e. a type of problem while the situation in which the driver is alerted and takes some avoidance action (e.g. slowingdown) is evaluated as a solution. To complete this process, it could be added that the new situation where the driver safely passes the section is implied to be evaluated as the result.

The second text structure, Hypothetical-Real, presents a hypothesis about the likely facts or Situation. It is described in contrast with the Situation-Evaluation structure as follows:

Unlike the Situation and Evaluation structure whose Situation presents something which "exists" within the knowledge or experience of the encoder and perhaps shared with his decoders, we are speaking of the role of the encoder where the Situation is not known or controversial. In such a case, the Situation becomes the Hypothesis which the encoder has to signal explicitly as hypothetical, and do likewise when s/he is repeating somebody else's statement in order to communicate it. (Winter 1994: 62)

This structure is based on the matching relation and has several developed patterns according to whether the comparison is affirmative or negative. When the comparison is affirmative, the pattern develops as *Hypothetical-Affirmation-Basis/Reason*. If the comparison is negative, the structure becomes *Hypothetical-Denial-Correction-Basis/Reason* and Hypothetical-Denial-Basis for Denial.

One of the examples of the structure is quoted below:

Example 3

The engineers expected *that the earthquake would have caused damage to their underground tunnel. It did;* it was at least the magnitude of 6 on the Richter Scale. (Winter 1994: 64 emphasis original)

In this example the Hypothetical-Affirmation is identified. The information contained in that-clause of the first sentence, *the earthquake would have caused damage to their underground tunnel*, is not a situation or fact but only an expectation, i.e. a type of hypothetical information. It is later affirmed as a fact in the second sentence.

One point should be noted about the meaning of the term *hypothetical*. Winter shows examples of linguistic signals for the hypothetical element: *assertion, assumption, belief, claim, conclusion, expect, feel, guess, illusion, imagine, proposition, rumour, speculation, suggestion, suppose, theory, think*, etc. Looking at the list one notices that all words included are associated with possibility or epistemicity: there are no items associated with deontic features. The definition of the structure, however, seems to be similarly applied to a type of text where deontic situation is compared with facts or reality. It is not clear

whether Winter includes the following text as one of the example of the H-R structure:

Example 4

(1)The extremists have been urging **Mr. Smith** to “**do something**”. (2) **He has done something**. (3) He has **taken measures which could make Rhodesia almost totalitarian** (*Observer*) (Winter 1977: 71, emphasis original)

Winter's original purpose of this text is to show the chataphoric function of (2) and its lexical realisation in (3). This example, however, can also be seen as affirmation by (2) of the hypothetical information expressed in (1): *Mr Smith does something*. (3) provides affirmatory particular. The hypothetical feature of this text is assigned to (1) by *urging*, which includes deontic meaning *should* in its semantics. Similarity between Examples 3 and 4 is due to the underlying clause relation: comparative affirmation. The difference is that at the point where the hypothesis was made, the engineers hypothesised about a situation which had already existed in the real world whereas the extremists did about a situation which had not existed yet.

The discussion in this section also has some implication for our schema: it can consist of many slots that establish syntagmatic and paradigmatic relation among themselves. The specification of each slot might be understood as a type of evaluation with the use of meta-language items since the slots are specified as problem, response, etc just as the clauses of text structures are evaluated as problem, response, etc.

6. Conclusion

In this paper I have reviewed several concepts that are essential building blocks of Eugene Winter's theory of discourse analysis known as the clause relational approach. Throughout the work I have become more confident about the possibility to modify it in such a way that it can be applied for the description of mental representations that the reader is assumed to construct in comprehension. As was mentioned in Introduction, Mental representation has remained something that can safely be averted by most linguists as is also evidenced by the title of Hoey's book *On the Surface of Discourse*. Winter's description of the theory, however, abounds in various cognitive and mentalistic concepts: for instance, the most fundamental concept of the theory, clause relation, is defined as a type of cognitive process as was discussed in Section 1.

With due respect to the great achievement by the proponents particularly in the field of lexical studies, which is not the least ascribable to their decision to stick to the surface form of text as much as possible, one dilemma I feel is that the restriction such as keeping the surface form intact in the analysis sometimes seems to lead to a rather undesirable consequence spoiling the chance of more dynamic interpretation of text. One of such cases is found in the definition of logical sequence relation. Though the relation between two clauses is explained as that of time sequence, such a simple explanation is not good enough to justify the use of the term *logical*. It is important to define what kind of logic underlies the relation and to explain why the presence of one member in text predicts that of the other in a more satisfactory manner. For this purpose, however, one cannot keep on staying on the surface of discourse. With respect to this point, it is interesting to see Winter's comment on the combination of “deductive reasoning” and “matching” which underlies concession relation (Winter: 1994,55). In his explanation of the concession relation found between a pair of clauses *I'm not rich and yet I am happy*, Winter assumes the “unexpressed” clause *I am not happy* which has been denied by *I am happy*. As is often the case with his writing, this explanation of the clause relation implies that Winter has stepped into the field

of mind.

As I stated before my purpose of reviewing Winter's work was to see which aspects of his theory could be adjusted for the description of mental representations. The concepts of his theory I discussed in this paper are all related to some aspects of the model that I have been designing for that purpose. I presented its very sketchy outline in Introduction and in each section tried to interpret Winter's concepts in terms of the notion of schema. I need more time before I can discuss how they are actually modified to fit in my model.

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